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by Willem B. Drees 
Abstract. The cosmology proposed by Stephen Hawking has been 
understood as support for an atheistic stance, due mainly to its 
view of the nature of time in combination with the absence of 
explicit boundary conditions. Against such a view, this article 
argues that one might develop a theistic understanding of the 
Universe in the context of Hawking’s cosmology. In addition, 
the quantum cosmologies of Andrej Linde and Roger Penrose 
are presented. The coexistence of different research programs and 
their implicit metaphysical views about the nature of quantum 
reality and time may have profound implications for philosophy 
and theology. 
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. . . a universe with no edge in space, no beginning or end in time, and nothing 
for a Creator to do. 
-Carl Sagan (1 988, x )  
Carl Sagan interprets the recent cosmology developed by Stephen 
Hawking as support for an atheistic stance. I will argue, however, 
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against Sagan, that Hawking’s cosmology does allow for a theistic 
understanding of the world as God’s creation. I will also point to 
other research programs in cosmology and argue that, through their 
content and coexistence, they may have implications for different 
views of theology and science. 
After this article reviews some limitations of the Big Bang 
theory, a few recent cosmologies will be presented, with emphasis on 
the “beginning,” time, and quantum reality.’ The article con- 
cludes with some implications for philosophy and theology and 
with an interpretation of creatio ex nihilo in the context of Hawking’s 
cosmology. 
LIMITS OF THE BIG BANG THEORY 
The Big Bang is the accepted theory about the evolution of the 
Universe; however, it is often misunderstood as dealing with an 
initial explosion. As expressed in the title of Steven Weinberg’s 
popular exposition, The First Three Minutes (1977), it seems as if the 
Universe has a beginning and as if we can describe the processes right 
from the start. Nevertheless, a closer look reveals certain problems 
with the second claim: our capability of describing the Universe from 
the very start and even uncertainty about the first claim, the begin- 
ning itself. 
The Big Bang theory is a combination of two different theories, 
general relativity about space-time and quantum theories about mat- 
ter. This combination implies three limits to the Big Bang theory: 
1. Current theories about matter are only valid up to a finite 
temperature and, hence, only after the first fraction of a second 
after the Singularity, the initial moment that follows from general 
relativity. Further speculations have to deal with temperatures and 
densities for which the relevant particle physics is not yet well 
established. 
2. Closer to the Singularity comes a moment, presumably the 
Planck time (a number constructed from the fundamental constants 
of quantum theory and gravity, about seconds after the initial 
Singularity in the Big Bang model), when general relativity must be 
replaced by a quantum theory of gravity. Before the Planck time the 
theories about space and time are not known; even the meaning- 
fulness of space and time is uncertain (which signals trouble: once time 
is no longer meaningful, it becomes unclear what can be meant by 
before). 
3.  The initial Singularity itself is a third limit, if there is an initial 
Singularity. Thus the Big Bang theory results in unrealistic numbers, 
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such as an infinite density. It has been shown that such singulari- 
ties are unavoidable in general relativity, once certain very general 
assumptions are made, like causality and a positive energy den- 
sity (Hawking and Penrose 1970). However, general relativity itself 
is probably invalid for moments before the Planck time. Whether 
there is a singular moment in a theory of quantum gravity which is 
to supersede general relativity cannot be decided a priori, before such 
a theory of quantum gravity has been proposed. 
The first and second limits are clearly limits to our present 
knowledge; the third limit, the Singularity, seems an edge of reality, 
but it is “hidden” behind the other two. 
T o  describe our Universe we need, in addition to physical laws, 
some initial conditions, numbers which are not explained by the theory 
but are assumed-for example, the density. The density turns out to 
be very close to the critical density, which is the boundary between 
an infinitely expanding (open) and a recollapsing (closed) universe. 
This leads to a question, called theflatnessproblem: Why is the density 
of our Universe so close to that density which corresponds to a 
“flat universe”? Such initial conditions are even more peculiar than 
they seem as a consequence of the horizon problem: regions that we 
observe in different directions have not been in causal contact during 
the whole history of the Universe, if one accepts the Big Bang theory, 
and yet they have the same density. 
Besides those initial conditions, the Big Bang theory also assumes 
certain general features of the Universe: the laws of physics, the three 
spatial dimensions and the one dimension of time, and even its very 
existence. 
Developments beyond the Big Bang theory do not mean that 
there is anything wrong with the theory. “In sum, all the available 
evidence indicates that the standard cosmology provides an accurate 
accounting of the evolution of the Universe from 0.01 sec after the 
bang [Singularity] until today, some 15 or so Byr [Billion years] 
later-quite a remarkable achievement!’’ (Turner 1985, 271) .  None 
of the scientists discussed below objects to the theory, within its 
limits. The problems and assumed initial conditions aren’t incon- 
sistencies but exhibit the limitations of the explanatory power of the 
Big Bang theory. The challenge for physicists has been to explain the 
assumptions (laws, initial conditions) and to extend the domain of 
validity of the theories. Three different approaches will be discussed, 
each by referring to the work of one major cosmologist: Andrej 
Linde, Stephen Hawking, and Roger Penrose. 
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ANDREJ LINDE: ETERNAL CHAOTIC COSMOLOGY 
The performance is still going on, and it will continue eternally. In different 
parts of the universe different observers see its endless variations. 
-Andrej Linde (1987b, 68) 
Andrej Linde, a Russian cosmologist, insists that the Universe 
underwent a period of rapid expansion-a so-called inflation.* His 
version is called chaotic inzution. Chaotic cosmologies try to explain 
such features as homogeneity, which we find special about our Uni- 
verse, as the consequence of natural processes, without requiring 
any special initial conditions. Earlier versions of chaotic cosmology 
emphasized the role of dissipative processes, which would smear 
out inhomogeneities and produce, after billions of years, a universe 
which looks as homogeneous as the Universe we observe. Imagine a 
beach where children have built castles from sand and another beach 
which remains untouched; after a few days of winds and tides, 
the two beaches look similar. Almost all initial conditions produce 
similar results if dissipative processes are sufficiently effective. 
Linde does not emphasize dissipative processes; rather, he 
proposes that the conditions for inflation have been satisfied in 
some regions (domains) of the Universe while not, or later, in other 
domains. Domains that inflate form very large bubbles. Sometimes 
these are called miniuniuerses, but mini should not be misunderstood; 
these domains are supposed to be much larger than the observable 
Universe. Each miniuniverse would resemble a Big Bang universe, 
quite homogeneous and of the right density. However, the Universe 
at large would not be homogeneous, but a cluster of bubbles, or mini- 
universes, attached to each other. 
Those bubble universes need not have the same properties. By 
analogy, the physics for water and ice is of course very differ- 
ent although the fundamental, underlying theory is the same. 
In cosmology, the underlying theory need not be based upon 
three spatial dimensions and one dimension of time. It might 
be ten- or eleven-dimensional. Some of those dimensions might 
“c0mpactify”-become very small. We observe the four “large” 
dimensions, whereas the others are unobservable as spatial dimen- 
sions, although their presence might be effective as interactions 
(forces) in a world described in terms of the large dimensions. 
There might be more than one way in which the higher-dimensional 
underlying structure might compactify and, hence, produce differ- 
ent bubbles with different numbers of dimensions and physical 
laws. 
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No Beginning. Bubble formation goes on; the universe “unceas- 
ingly reproduces itself and becomes immortal” (Linde 1987b, 66). 
People and miniuniverses die, but the show goes on. It “no longer 
seems necessary to assume that there actually was somefirst mini 
universe appearing from nothing or from an initial singularity at 
some moment t = 0 before which there was no space-time at all” 
(Linde 1987b, 66). This solves “the singularity problem. The prob- 
lem is not the existence of singularities in the Universe, but the state- 
ment (or common belief) that the Universe does not exist eternally 
and that there exists ‘some time at which there is no spacetime at 
all’ ” (Linde 1987a, 606).3 
Linde’s approach is mostly formulated in evolutionary terms-for 
instance, “inflation” as spatial expansion in time. However, he 
also holds that there is no evolution in time for the Universe as a 
whole. “What we measure is phenomenological time, which can 
be introduced by a local observer inside a long-living virtual mini- 
universe. . . . An eastern philosopher would say that the absolute 
does not evolve in time, but the virtual apparent world is observed 
as being time-dependent” (Linde 1985, 289; see also Linde 1989, 
355). This time is not strictly restricted to the inside of a bubble. 
“Any two points of such a universe in a sufficiently distant past could 
be causally connected and corresponding observers could syn- 
chronise their clocks even though later they may live in mini 
universes which have become causally disconnected due to the expo- 
nential expansion of the universe” (Linde 1987a, 620). 
Existence of ALL Possibilities. The conditions for different mini 
universes appear by chance. Some domains inflate to a more signifi- 
cant long-lived status, which gives, as Linde acknowledged (1987b, 
66), a Darwinian flavor to his cosmology. There are mutations, 
as subsequent bubbles may be different-for instance, in dimen- 
sionality. Selection finds its parallel in inflation, which gives a long 
life to a bubble. Linde combines the idea of selection operating on 
chance mutations with another, rather different but in my opinion 
more fundamental, philosophical idea: the realization of all possi- 
bilities. For instance, all possible dimensionalities and phenomeno- 
logical laws of physics “should exist in different domains of the 
universe” (Linde 1987a, 623). “One may say therefore that not only 
could God create the universe differently, but in His wisdom He 
created a universe which has been unceasingly producing different 
[mini-] universes of all possible types” (Linde 1987a, 607). 
Even though all possible bubbles in Linde’s cosmology become 
actual in the eternity of time available, this is only what is possible 
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within his cosmology. Whether God has any options besides such 
an eternal chaotic universe, with all its bubbles, is the form the 
uniqueness question takes at this level. Uniqueness is not settled by 
saying that all possibilities of this theory are realized; it would be 
necessary to say whether any other theories are possible. Let us 
therefore look at other proposals, such as the quantum cosmology of 
Hawking. 
STEPHEN HAWKING: TIMELESS QUANTUM 
COSMOLOGY 
I think that the initial conditions are as suitable a subject for scientific investiga- 
tion as are the local physical laws. We shall not have a complete theory until we 
can do more than merely say that “things are as they are because they were as 
they were.” 
-Stephen Hawking (1980), in Boslaugh (1985, 133) 
Stephen Hawking, a famous English cosmologist, titled his inaugural 
lecture for the Lucassian chair (Newton’s chair) at Cambridge Is the 
End  in Sight for Theoretical Physics? According to him, physics is about 
to discover and explain the most fundamental laws, as well as the 
ultimate boundary conditions for the Universe. This is against the 
standard view, which sees initial conditions, or boundary conditions, 
as given-as the way a situation has been set up. Ordinary physics 
explains a collision of billiard balls, given their initial positions and 
velocities. Hawking holds that physics can, when considering the 
whole, do without such an unexplainable given. He  proposed in 
1983, in collaboration with James Hartle, a quantum cosmology that 
seems to do without initial (or boundary) conditions. 
In the Big Bang theory the state of a universe at one time can be 
calculated on the basis of the Einstein equations and at another time 
as a boundary condition. In that sense, one could say that one state 
“arises out of” another state. One could visualize this as a pancake- 
a slice of time with the two large surfaces representing the initial 
and the final state in the calculation. (Each surface in this image 
stands for the three-dimensional space with material content at a 
given moment; the pancake is supposed to be a four-dimensional 
The Hartle-Hawking proposal does without such another state. 
The probability of one state is calculated while that state is the only 
boundary. (We have to deal with probabilities since the proposal is 
in the context of quantum physics.) Instead of a pancake with two 
surfaces, as suggested for the standard view, one could think of a 
single closed surface, such as the surface of a sphere, representing 
volume. ”) 6 6  
Willem B. Drees 379 
only one state. There would be no need for another boundary in the 
calculation; a compact surface, like that of a sphere, has no bound- 
aries even though it is finite. As Hawking has formulated it,  the 
boundary condition for the Universe is that it has no boundary. 
However, requiring compactness or even the absence of a bound- 
ary is in a sense a boundary condition-although not of properties of 
fields on the boundary but rather of the properties of the boundary 
itself. Hawking’s proposal is certainly of an attractive simplicity, 
but other metaphysical views might lead to other proposals for 
the boundary condition. For example, Frank Tipler proposed the 
“Teilhard boundary condition, ’ ’ which is essentially an idea about 
the future boundary (Tipler 1989, 239). And Alexander Vilenkin 
(1986, 3568) proposed a boundary condition based on causality, an 
idea that seems similar in spirit to the cosmology of Roger Pen- 
rose, who assumes a fundamental difference between initial and final 
singularities (see below). 
Hawking’s “trick” has its repercussions. Ordinary time, with the 
notion of becoming, disappears. One could still see a trace of the 
original time variable in the internal four-dimensional space which 
fits at the three-dimensional boundary, but it is an imaginary time 
variable, and thereby the time dimension is completely on a par with 
the spatial dimensions. There is no reason to call the fourth dimen- 
sion a time variable at this level.4 The calculations are complicated, 
and certainly so if one includes all fields that should be part of a 
realistic theory. No model describing our Universe exists yet, but 
there are some indications that the density-at least in a simplified 
model-should be close to the critical density (Hawking and Page 
1986) and that most universes of this type have an inflationary phase 
(Gibbons, Hawking, and Stewart 1987). 
One can still reconstruct the notion of time by changing to another 
description, since the Hartle-Hawking cosmology has two levels of 
calculation. The approach described, which is the unique feature of 
this proposal, does not refer to any other state in calculating the 
probability of one state. In that sense the theory is a timeless descrip- 
tion of the states of the Universe. But one can consider two states at 
different moments, so thus this is a description from within time. To 
reconstruct this description from the timeless perspective, the notion 
of time has to be introduced, and the three-dimensional spaces have 
to be ordered in a time sequence. Time can be defined on the basis 
of the fields and the geometry of the states. In that sense, time is 
a phenomenological construct. (Something similar is possible in a 
Big Bang universe, where time can be defined on the basis of the 
temperature of the background radiation or on the curvature.) 
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In the timeless approach, one can calculate the probabilities of all 
of the three-dimensional spaces and then line them up in stacks which 
resemble four-dimensional space-times, like our Big Bang Universe. 
It turns out that those sequences behave according to an equation 
which describes their evolution-if the system is described from 
within time. 
Compared with the Big Bang theory, there are two important 
qualifications: 
1. This theory does not produce one stack, that is, one Big 
Bang Universe. The three-dimensional spaces form a variety of such 
stacks, each stack corresponding to one particular evolutionary 
sequence of three-dimensional geometry and matter configurations 
in a universe. 
2. Not all spaces fit in a stack, and hence not all can be interpreted 
as being part of an evolutionary sequence. The theory works well for 
the states that reproduce the classical theory. “But the more ‘quan- 
tum mechanical’ . . . the state, the harder it becomes to sustain an 
interpretation of anything ‘evolving’ in time. In effect, the con- 
cept of ‘spacetime’ only has an unambiguous meaning within 
the framework of non-quantum physics, whereas the idea of three- 
dimensional ‘space’ can be applied to both the quantum and the 
classical theories” (Isham 1988, 397). 
In summary, in this theory the timeless level of description is more 
fundamental than the description from within time. 
“Beginning” as a Feature of the Description. This theory avoids the 
problem of an initial Singularity, a t = 0, as in the Big Bang theory. 
Time near the Singularity is unlike our ordinary time. If one uses the 
Hartle-Hawking scheme for spaces which are close to the “begin- 
ning” of the Big Bang Universe (i.e., small spaces), one would expect 
to approach the interesting t = 0 moment. However, “the phenome- 
nological time begins to pick up something like an imaginary part 
with its associated non-physical features. By this means, the problem 
of the ‘beginning of time’ is adroitly averted” (Isham 1988, 400). In 
this sense, there is no initial Singularity where the theory breaks 
down. Only our interpretation, in terms of our usual notion of time, 
breaks down. 
A more visual way to present it has been used by Hawking. There 
is a beginning of the coordinate, but no edge-as the North Pole is 
an extreme of our coordinates based on degrees of latitude, but not 
an edge of the globe. “Time ceases to be well defined in the very early 
universe just as the direction ‘north’ ceases to be well defined at the 
North Pole of the Earth. . . . The quantity that we measure as time 
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had a beginning, but that does not mean spacetime has an edge, just 
as the surface of the Earth does not have an edge at the North Pole’’ 
(Hawking 1984b, 358, and 1984c, 14). As the space-time is com- 
pact, according to his proposal, a past or future infinity is impossible. 
“Thus, in this sense, the universe will have a beginning and an end” 
(Hawking 1987,650). However, that need not be a Singularity in the 
sense of a breakdown of the laws of physics. 
Hawking points to the similarity between his view and the view of 
Augustine,’ who introduced in the Christian tradition the notion of 
creation with time, in which time is part of the created order. Accord- 
ing to Hawking, “time is just a coordinate that labels events in the 
universe. It does not have any meaning outside the spacetime mani- 
fold. T o  ask what happened before the universe began is like asking 
for a point on Earth at 91 O north latitude; it just is not defined. Instead 
of talking about the universe being created, and maybe coming to an 
end, one should just say: The universe is” (Hawking 1987, 651). 
There is, of course, a very important difference between Augustine 
and Hawking. Augustine no doubt understood the beginning of time 
simultaneously with the creation as an event outside the scope of 
natural knowledge. But Hawking holds it to be only the beginning 
of a coordinate, without reference to any special event and with- 
out a breakdown of physical describability. For Hawking, this has 
theological implications. “SO long as the universe had a beginning, 
we could suppose it had a creator. But if the universe is really com- 
pletely self-contained, having no boundary or edge, it would have 
neither beginning nor end: it would simply be. What place, then, for 
a creator?” (Hawking 1988, 141). 
ROGER PENROSE: TIME-ASYMMETRIC REALIST 
COSMOLOGY 
My own line of argument has been driven, in part under the sting of Hawking’s 
penetrating criticism, into some dangerous but fascinating territory. 
-Roger Penrose (1981, 244) 
Roger Penrose, a mathematician and cosmologist from Oxford, 
proved in the late 1960s, together with Hawking, theorems about the 
presence of singularities in wide classes of physically reasonable solu- 
tions of the equations of general relativity (Hawking and Pen- 
rose 1970). However, he has taken another path than Hawking with 
respect to time, the nature of quantum reality, and the specialness of 
the universe. Those issues form the heart of the “dangerous but 
fascinating territory. ” 6  
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Specialness of the Initial State. According to Hawking, the initial 
conditions of the Universe are the only ones that are possible; he does 
not allow variety. Linde argues that ail possibilities happen from time 
to time. Penrose, who argues that the initial state was very special, 
based his argument on entropy. The observed entropy per baryon 
(proton, neutron) is about lo8, and there are about lo8” baryons in 
the observable Universe. Hence the total entropy of the observable 
Universe is loa8. This seems enormous but is, according to Penrose, 
incredibly low. If all the mass would have been clustered in solar-size 
black holes, the entropy per “baryon” would have been lo2”, and 
hence the total entropy would have been 10“’”. If the whole observ- 
able Universe consisted of only one black hole, its entropy would be 
10””. “This provides us with a measure of the degree to which the 
initial state was special” (Penrose 1981, 248). 
Penrose considers an anthropic explanation: could the observed 
(or inferred) low entropy be explained as a requirement for life and 
consciousness? In his view, such an explanation fails. A universe with 
an entropy of would have fitted as well, and it would have been 
“a vastly ‘cheaper’ method than the one which appears actually 
to have been used” (Penrose 1981, 254). “Indeed, it would appear 
from this that the Creator was not particularly ‘concerned’ about our 
existence, but was constrained in some very precise time-asymmetric 
way for some quite other reason. From this point of view, our present 
existence would arise merely as a byproduct!” (Penrose 1981,255). 
Time Asymmetry. If time were reversible, the beginning of the 
Universe would have to be like the end. In Penrose’s view, time is 
asymmetric, which is in accord with his emphasis on the specialness 
of the initial conditions. Penrose accepts that all the laws of ordinary 
physics are time-symmetrical; even the standard explanation that the 
asymmetry we observe is an effect of the low entropy of the initial 
conditions. But that leaves the question why those initial conditions 
were so special. Penrose holds that there must be a law which severely 
restricts initial singularities. He  conjectures that this law would imply 
the absence of gravitational clumping in initial states. Although it 
looks like an initial condition, he presents it as a new law, which 
should hold for all initial singularities. 
The asymmetry of time is, for Penrose, not manifest only in the 
initial conditions. He lists seven “arrows of time,” most of which 
can be traced back to the specialness of the initial conditions. For 
Hawking, the time symmetry of the theory is beyond doubt, and the 
apparent time asymmetry of the observations needs to be explained 
away. For Penrose it is the opposite: the experience of time asym- 
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metry is taken as beyond doubt and hence the theory should be 
changed to incorporate it. “The puzzle then becomes: why does 
Nature choose to hide,this time-asymmetry so effectively?” (Penrose 
1979, 638). Another hidden asymmetry can be found in biology. 
Almost all animals on Earth are externally symmetric with respect to 
their left and right sides; however, the DNA molecules which guide 
the growth of these symmetric beings are all asymmetric, and all in 
the same way (Penrose 1979,638). 
Quantum Reality. Quantum theories are successful, but their 
interpretation is still subject to discussion. The state vector (or, 
equivavalently, the wave function) might describe the system as 
being in a combination of a plurality of states, say an electron with 
spin up or down, or a particle going through gate A or gate B. This 
is called a linear superposition, as the different possibilities are added in 
the state vector without interfering with one another. Some tried to 
escape this view of reality by claiming that the superposition merely 
reflects our ignorance (“hidden variables”). This has been shown to 
imply that one must give up on physics as describing local inter- 
actions which do not immediately affect the state of the system at 
other places. One could perhaps live with the superposition as real 
at a submicroscopic, quantum level; but it carries over to macro- 
scopic objects. Penrose rejects the famous thought experiment of 
Schrodinger’s cat in a superposition of being both dead and alive. 
“Surely, at that level the cat is either dead or alive’’ (Penrose 1987a, 
32). The tension between the many possibilities and the (apparently) 
one actuality lends itself to a wide variety of interpretations. 
The Many Worlds Interpretation, first proposed by Everett 
(1957; see also DeWitt and Graham 1973), maintains the superposi- 
tion throughout. All possible outcomes of measurements are actual 
outcomes. This might be interpreted as a branching of the world into 
many “worlds” with slight differences, with, say, the spin of an elec- 
tron along a vertical or a horizontal axis. Since any process with dif- 
ferent possible outcomes implies splitting, this view seems to lead 
to an enormous number of “universes, ’ ’ coexisting without inter- 
acting. However, Tipler has argued forcefully that “everything else” 
need not split with the property considered; quantum transitions on 
distant stars do not induce splits in human beings.’ In any event, 
the many worlds idea eliminates the tension between potentiality and 
actuality by equating them. 
The idea of superposition at macroscopic levels has been criti- 
cized heavily (e.g., Bell 1981, Stein 1984, Healey 1984, Shimony 
1986). Indeed, Penrose assumes that there is no superposition for 
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macroscopic bodies, although the principle is valid at the quan- 
tum level. Rejecting the transfer of superpositions from the quan- 
tum level to the macroscopic level implies that there has to be a 
reduction of the many possible states to one state. It has been 
related to measurements (the Copenhagen interpretation) or the 
involvement of consciousness (which is in itself not well understood). 
Attributing the reduction to consciousness “seems to assign a 
privileged role to those corners of the Universe where con- 
sciousness resides-and they may be very rare indeed” (Penrose 
1987a, 33). 
Penrose thinks that quantum mechanics, with its linear super- 
position, has to be replaced by a nonlinear theory, which per- 
haps would not have these problems. This would be similar to 
the transition from Newton’s theory of gravitation, which has the 
total gravitational force as a linear superposition of the forces con- 
tributed by the sources, to Einstein’s general theory of relativity, 
which is “an astonishing non-linear theory of even greater mathe- 
matical elegance” (Penrose 1987a, 34). Penrose has not formulated 
that theory (yet), but he offers a suggestion. The “linear superposi- 
tion of states will cease to be maintained by nature as soon as 
the states become significantly differently coupled into the gravita- 
tional field” (Penrose 1986b, 50). “The idea is that, in a sense, 
Nature abhors complex linear combinations of differing spacetime 
geometries!” (Penrose 1987a, 44). This seems to have testable con- 
sequences, like a prediction of minimal bubble sizes in a bubble 
chamber-a measuring device to detect tracks of elementary particles 
(Penrose 1986a, 144). The theory will be “non-local in a way that 
fundamentally affects even the very fabric of spacetime. I do not 
expect, except perhaps at some temporary provisional level, that 
we shall be able to get away with a theory which describes objec- 
tive reality taking place within some ambient spacetime” (Penrose 
1987a, 45). 
Penrose (1987b, 1989) even suggested that this approach might 
result in understanding the nature of consciousness. Life thrives 
on minute effects in chemistry. Similarly, Penrose speculates, con- 
sciousness might be a phenomenon that thrives on minute effects in 
physics which happen at the transition from the quantum realm to 
the realm describable by classical physics. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR SCIENCE AND THEOLOGY 
These three very different approaches make it seem that cosmology 
is open to metaphysical influences, especially from this representa- 
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tive diversity at the frontier of cosmology. Thus, as will be discussed 
below, this could be one of the few places where religious positions 
might actually and rightly influence scientific research, by influenc- 
ing its metaphysical choices. The limits of the Big Bang theory are 
very relevant to its use in cosmological arguments for the existence 
of God. The diversity and the lack of scientific consensus also have 
implications for the way theology should deal with science, at least 
with cosmology, as we will see. 
Metaphysics and the Variety of Cosmologies. According to a philo- 
sopher of science, Imre Lakatos, one can describe science as consist- 
ing of various research programs.’ Such programs are more or 
less coherent series of theories, characterized by a hard core-the 
hypotheses that are kept fixed. Other hypotheses can be added or 
changed, according to theoretical or empirical needs, to form a pro- 
tective belt around the core. It is in this outer area that one finds the 
major development within a program. The development is not hap- 
hazard but is guided by a long-term research policy: the positive 
heuristic. Theoretical science has a more or less autonomous devel- 
opment, guided more by the awareness of the unsatisfactory charac- 
ter of the theory at each moment than by specific, experimental 
results. 
Although we did not discuss the development of cosmologies, they 
exhibit these same characteristics as a series of articles which modify 
their ideas within a basic continuity (Drees 1990b). Our cosmologists 
agree for their hard core on the validity of the Big Bang theory after 
“the first fraction of a second” and on what can be called the stan- 
dard problems of this model. They also agree that the Copenhagen 
interpretation of quantum mechanics is unsatisfactory, since the 
notion of an observer makes no sense for the Universe as a whole. 
However, these cosmologies are nonetheless rather different, espe- 
cially with respect to time and quantum reality, and therefore have 
different problems to solve. Penrose needs to explain how reality 
becomes classical through a natural reduction of the state vector, 
and Hawking needs to explain why observers see a definite uni- 
verse instead of the superposition of many states that is his view of 
reality. Penrose must also explain why his time asymmetry is mostly 
hidden-in other words, why time-symmetric physics (Newtonian, 
relativistic, and quantum physics) works so well. For Hawking, 
asymmetries need to be explained on the basis of a symmetric theory 
and symmetric boundary conditions. Implicitly, these cosmologists 
disagree about the data. For Penrose, the time-asymmetric phe- 
nomena are real. For Hawking, time asymmetry is, in principle, an 
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illusion. His aim is not to incorporate the asymmetry, but to explain 
time-asymmetric phenomena away. 
According to Lakatos, “one may formulate the ‘positive heuristic’ 
of a research program as a ‘metaphysical’ principle” (Lakatos 1970 
[ 1978, 51 ] ). Lakatos uses metaphysical “as a technical term of naive 
falsificationism: a contingent proposition is ‘metaphysical’ if it has no 
‘potential falsifiers’ ” (Lakatos 1970 [ 1978, 47, n. 21 ). 
For the cosmological programs discussed in this article, the ideas 
are not “metaphysical” only in the sense that they are beyond dis- 
pute, at least each within its program, they are also metaphysical 
in the classical sense, as they are about such issues as the relation 
between potential and actual existence, the nature of space and time, 
the (dis)similarity of future and past, and the contingency or neces- 
sity of the universe. These metaphysical elements are most clearly 
visible in the positive heuristic as ideas guiding the direction of the 
research, and hence influencing the next step in the development of 
the program. 
Science is in general leading our understanding of the world. How- 
ever, metaphysical influences in constructing even the most abstract 
theories about our Universe provide an opportunity for religious 
influence on scientific research. If one has a strong theological 
interest in history, one would prefer a metaphysics which incor- 
porates time asymmetry. Hence, one might prefer to work in a 
program which fits that interest, as Penrose’s program does. If 
one’s religion is more about God as the ultimate, atemporal, tran- 
scendent Ground, one might prefer something like Hawking’s 
approach. Metaphysical diversity on such issues as the nature of time 
and reality means that one can achieve consonance in some cases by 
opting for that scientific program which best fits one’s theological 
ideas. 
I am not claiming that all scientists have such religious convictions. 
Nor do I mean to imply that theologians should give the scientists 
advice; the work of the scientists is far too complex. But I suggest 
that the religious convictions of a scientist might be reflected in the 
research that he or she pursues. A professional theologian or philoso- 
pher might, perhaps, be of some help by making as explicit as possi- 
ble the substance and metaphysical background of such convictions. 
Also, the fact that there is a plurality of programs in cosmological 
research beyond the Big Bang theory might have implications for the 
way one can relate the results of science to theology. 
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Cosmological Arguments for  the Existence of God. The temporal cos- 
mological argument for the existence of God on the basis of a begin- 
ning of the Universe (e.g., Craig 1979) turns out not to be univocally 
supported by science as research progresses beyond the Big Bang 
theory. Some theories have a beginning, others are without an 
absolute beginning (e.g., Linde’s), and still other theories present a 
view in which the “beginning” loses its special status as a feature 
of reality (e.g., Hawking’s). It is not amazing that theologians and 
philosophers are not informed about current cosmological research, 
but it is a serious failure ifone neglects the limits of the theories one uses. 
A nontemporal version of the cosmological argument, which 
claims that the whole series of states, whether finite or infinite, needs 
an explanation, has been defended by, among others, Richard Swin- 
burne (1979). The present research does not affect his argument that 
ultimately we have to choose between two possibilities: “the universe 
as a stopping-point and God as a stopping-point” (Swinburne 1979, 
127). However, his argument for preferring God as the stopping- 
point rests on the claim that “God” is a much simpler assumption 
than the Universe, with all its complexities, and this assump- 
tion might be doubted from the perspective of contemporary cos- 
mology. Theories about the Universe gain continuously in elegance 
and simplicity-if not in the calculations, at least in their struc- 
ture and assumptions-and hence those theories might be a simpler 
stopping-point than “God.” 
Theology and the Lack of Consensus in Science. Some in “science and 
religion’’ focus on methodological issues, but science is also theologi- 
cally relevant for its content. For instance, Hawking has a quite dif- 
ferent view of the nature of time than Penrose. This implies different 
views of history and processes, which bear upon many theological 
issues. 
Many authors, in contributing to “science and religion,’’ restrict 
themselves to the areas where science shows consensus. However, 
this is much less secure than it seems. For instance, the Big Bang 
theory suggests a certain view of the “beginning” of the Universe, 
but a more detailed study of scientific research shows that the inter- 
esting issues are not in the Big Bang theory but just beyond its limits, 
in current research. And, even worse, though the different programs 
accept the Big Bang theory, they disagree on many issues of its inter- 
pretation because they envisage a different, further development of 
the scientific understanding of the universe. This raises the question 
of the relevance of the established scientific theories for theology. 
If one leaves the domain of consensus, one has to face the plurality 
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of approaches at the leading edge of research. This is not only the 
case for cosmology, but holds as well for other areas of fundamental 
physics-for instance, the interpretation of quantum mechanics or 
thermodynamics (see, e.g., Russell 1988,370). 
Should one in “science and theology” restrict oneself to the most 
promising ideas (but how does one know?), pick the idea that best fits 
one’s personal view (but that is rather selective), or wait till there is 
consensus (which might take a long time)? In my opinion, intelligible 
models may be developed in the context of as many approaches as 
feasible, with the intention of learning from each what one can and 
cannot say meaningfully about theological concepts within that scien- 
tific program. However, once one is after plausibility, or even truth, 
persistent plurality becomes more problematic. We should be willing 
to face that scientific program that is the hardest to encompass- 
a kind of reverse eclecticism: take science “where it ‘hurts’ most” 
(Eaves 1989,203). We may have to accept the provisional nature and 
uncertain status of all theological models, even if they have been built 
upon the available scientific consensus. 
EDGES, CREATION, AND NOTHING 
In this section we will focus on the notion of creation out of nothing in 
the context of such cosmologies as that of Hawking. The absence of 
a beginning of time in some theories has been taken by some to imply 
the absence of a Creator. It will be argued that this rests on a view 
of God and God’s role in creation which is not the view of most 
developed theologies. Our second issue is the claim that physical 
cosmology is now able to describe creation out of nothing. It will be 
argued that this physical concept of nothing is not identical to the 
philosophical concept. 
Edges and Deism. For Carl Sagan the issue is simple: If Hawking 
is right, that there is no absolute beginning of reality, there is no need 
for a Creator. This is quite similar to the argument of others, that 
a beginning in the Big Bang sense supports belief in a Creator. 
However, a good number of theologians and others have argued that 
the two-a physical beginning and belief in God-are mutually 
independent. 
One could have an image of God as the great watchmaker who 
constructed the world and wound the spring-before letting it run by 
itself according to the original design. In  relation to such an image 
of God the beginning is very important, for it is there that the watch- 
maker did his (or her) job. This kind of theological imagery has been, 
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and perhaps still is, widespread, as well as that of God as “an 
Old Man up there.” Belief in the watchmaker-God has been labeled 
deism, in contrast to theism, which holds that God is actively involved 
in the processes of the world at later moments. Contemporary theo- 
logians have in many different ways argued that it is of major impor- 
tance to see God as related to the present. A purely Deistic concept of 
God is not a serious option within contemporary theology, because 
such a God would not be relevant to us and the ways we shape our 
lives. 
Removal of a beginning would imply that the watchmaker God is 
not a defensible image. That seems to be the essence of Sagan’s 
remark. However, that is not a deathblow to theism, as it is not the 
kind of God theism defends. For some theologies it is even the 
other way round. For instance, process theology, a theological strand 
which developed on the basis of the philosophies of Whitehead and 
Hartshorne, argues that there is no absolute beginning but only an 
eternal process in which the world and God exert influence on each 
other (e.g., see Cobb and Griffin 1976). This particular theology 
does not fit the Hawking theory either, because their views of the 
nature of time are very different. But the example of such a theology, 
which is intellectually well developed, shows that theology is not 
necessarily bound to an absolute beginning, an edge to time. 
Whether it is possible to develop a theological view which fits 
the whole picture, not only the “edgelessness” but also the nature of 
time, the determinism, and the completeness suggested in the Hawk- 
ing cosmology, remains to be seen. But Sagan’s argument, “No 
edge, hence no God,” is not decisive. Aside from the possibilities 
which might still be present in the context of the Hawking cosmology, 
one also needs to keep in mind the status of this cosmology. As argued 
above, there is a genuine pluralism in contemporary cosmology, and 
this pluralism is most significant where the cosmologies touch on the 
most fundamental metaphysical questions. Hence, one could opt for 
a cosmology which allows for such an edge, a beginning of time, as 
Penrose’s cosmology does. 
Out of Nothing. Hartle and Hawking interpreted their proposal 
for the wave function of the universe as conceding the probability 
“for the universe to appear from Nothing” (Hartle and Hawking 
1983, 2961). In this section I will argue that the Hartle-Hawking 
theory does not describe such an appearance-out-of-nothing, if that 
notion is taken in its absolute sense. Neither do other theories, such 
as those of Vilenkin. In the subsequent section I will argue that the 
Hartle-Hawking theory can be interpreted in the sense of creatio 
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ex nihilo, but that this theological notion should then be understood 
as a view of the universe as sustained by God at every moment, rather 
than as a cosmogonic expression. 
There is one sense in which Hawking’s theory can most clearly 
be understood as creation from “nothing. ” As was explained 
above, ordinary calculations often assume a state at one moment and 
laws to calculate the state at another moment. One might say that 
the second state arises out of the first state. There is in the Hartle- 
Hawking approach at the timeless level no reference to a state other 
than the “resulting” state. Because it is compact, it is the only 
boundary in the calculation. The theory gives a precise meaning 
to the notion of nothing as the absence of other boundaries in 
the calculation. However, this should not be misunderstood as 
appearance-out-of-nothing. Appearance is a temporal notion, while 
“from nothing’’ applies to a time-independent actuality. 
The “nothing” is not an absolute nothing. One “must still grant 
the existence of quite a body of pre-existing laws of Nature in order 
to get away with this trick” (Barrow 1988, 231; similarly Heller 
1987, 421)-for example, quantum laws and fields as well as mathe- 
matical logic. The “nothing” which has a precise meaning in the 
context of this proposal is not an absolute “nothing” in a more 
philosophical sense. 
There are serious problems when one tries to combine the lan- 
guage of probabilities with the notion of nothing: 
1. The probability of “heads” when tossing a coin is fifty- 
fifty-but there is a 50 percent chance of actually getting “heads” 
if and only $ someone tosses a coin; that is, if, and only if, 
one of the possible outcomes is actualized. A mathematical idea 
of getting a universe from nothing will not produce a physical 
universe, but only the idea of a physical universe-assuming that 
there is a difference between the universe and a mathematical 
idea about the universe. There has to be some input of “physical 
reality.” Perhaps that is an aspect of the nothingness, but that 
aspect makes it into a physical entity and not into nothing at 
all. 
2. Physical probabilities, as exemplified by radioactive decay, 
start with something, with an initial situation (a particle in space and 
time) becoming another situation (other particles in space and time). 
The probability is that the transition from situation 1 to situation 2 
happens during a certain interval of time, or that the particle is found 
in a certain volume of space, or something of that nature. Even if one 
reduces the entities in the first situation as much as possible (no 
energy, no matter fields, etc.), talking about probabilities makes 
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sense only if there is some measurable structure (such as time) in the 
first situation. 
Interpreting the Hartle-Hawking wave function as giving proba- 
bilities for appearance-out-of-nothing is too strong. More defensible 
and modest, rather is the claim that it “determines the relative 
probability of universes corresponding to different classical solu- 
tions,’ (Hawking 1984a, 377). 
Creation as Cosmogony or Dependency. Traditional theological ideas 
about creatio ex nihilo have two poles. O n  the one hand they refer to 
cosmogony, the coming into being of our universe. O n  the other 
hand they denote eternal sustaining by God, ultimate dependence at 
each moment. Chris Isham states that the latter concept “is some- 
what decoupled from modern scientific thought” (Isham 1988, 376), 
a view that is probably widely shared among modern theologians and 
scientists. However, a recent exception is Pannenberg, who argued 
that the notion of “inertia” (or mass) in physics is at odds with the 
theological idea that the world is continuously sustained by God 
(Pannenberg 1981, 1988). 
In my view, the Hawking cosmology lends itself more to an 
interpretation in terms of sustaining rather than making. The basic 
entities are three-dimensional spaces with their material content 
(fields). Therefore, these are to be seen in this context as the basic 
entities of creation, the “what” that is created, and their relative 
probabilities can be calculated on the timeless level. It is not that 
one results from the other or comes after the other. From the 
timeless perspective, they are all coeternal, or they are all created 
“timelessly.” Hence they all are equally related to the Ground of 
Being. Another way to argue for the same conclusion is to say that 
this scheme does not have an initial event with a special status. There 
is no way to pick one slice as the first of the sequence. Hence, all 
moments have a similar relation to the Creator. Either they are all 
“just brute facts” or they are all equally created. This view of God 
“sustaining” the world in all its “times” was transformed by Isham 
into another image: “One can almost imagine the universe . . . 
being held in the cup of God’s hand” (Isham 1988, 405). 
T o  summarize, this theory allows for a precise interpretation of 
ex nihilo, and it fits better with the idea that every space (with content) 
is equally created by God than with the idea that God created “the 
beginning. ” Questions about the relation between the two com- 
ponents of creatio ex nihilo follow. Understanding creation as a cos- 
mogonic process seems to single out a certain event as having 
a special relation to God, whereas sustaining tends to stress the 
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similarity of all states in their relation to God. Theologians who want 
to defend both components of creatio ex nihilo need to clarify the simi- 
larity and dissimilarity between the first and the later states in their 
relation to God. In the theory discussed here, no moment has a 
special status, and therefore the cosmogonic interpretation loses its 
force. 
Theology in the Context of Hawking’s Cosmology. The cosmologies 
described in this article provide different contexts for theologi- 
cal thought. A theology that fits one cosmology need not accord 
with the other cosmological programs. Hawking’s cosmology, as 
one of the well-developed contemporary programs, does not fit 
theologies that put a strong emphasis on processes in time. Amaz- 
ingly, his quantum cosmology seems much closer to two seventeenth- 
century views and might be made consonant with traditional 
Reformed theology, which saw everything as predetermined by 
God. Also, it might be combined with a Spinozistic view of God 
and the world, where the world is one of God’s eternal modes of 
being. As does the traditional reformed view, Hawking’s approach 
accepts strict determinism. In a sense, however, the Spinozistic 
view fits even better, as the Universe acquires in Hawking’s cos- 
mology some of God’s characteristics, being timeless, eternal, and 
In case one tries to combine Hawking’s cosmology with a Chris- 
tian view of the world, there is one major difficulty. As presented 
here, his theory is about three-dimensional spaces with material con- 
tent. They may be ordered in time-sequences, but that is secondary. 
Therefore, Hawking’s model lacks continuity between subsequent 
events, like the continuity we find in reading the first and then the 
second word of a sentence.’ One might evoke God as the One who 
gives continuity, but that makes God “close the gaps,” to turn a 
phrase. In the major Christian traditions there is a sense of con- 
tinuity, as God’s great deeds in the past (e.g., in Exodus, the cove- 
nant on’ Sinai, the Incarnation, the Resurrection) are supposed 
to have relevance for today and for the future. In a Christian 
perspective, the past has to be taken into the present in some 
way. 
A final word of caution: this theory is not the conclusion of science 
today. It is still in development, and it is only one program among 
others, although one of the most elegant and coherent. The special 
feature of the Hartle-Hawking proposal is the absence of boundaries, 
its specific form of ex nihilo. 
necessary. ’ ’ < ‘  
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NOTES 
1. The discussion of recent developments in science has to’ be very incomplete. At a 
popular level, more can be found in Pagels (1985), Trefil (1983), Davies (1984), and 
other books as well as in the article by Odenwald (1989). Convenient access to current 
research can be gained from conference proceedings. 
2. Energy is conserved during “inflation.” Binding energy, provided by the attrac- 
tive force of gravity, is negative since it costs energy to free constituents. Gravitational 
energy becomes even more negative due to the inflationary expansion. This provides 
energy that is converted into radiation and particles when the inflationary expansion 
ends. 
3. Linde accepts the existence of singularities but argues that they may be more or 
less local phenomena and hence do not imply a beginning for the whole Universe (see 
Linde 1987a, 619). 
4. Imaginary must not be misunderstood as opposed to fuctual; it is a technical 
term for numbers which, by definition,, give, a negative result when squared. 
“Distances” in space-time (d2 = x2 + y‘ + t‘ - c‘ . 1’) combine the spatial coordinates 
x, y ,  and t with the time coordinate t, but they aren’t on a par. The minus sign has enor- 
mous consequences-for instance, solutions in general relativity may be spatially finite 
without edges (like the surface of a sphere), but with edges in time, have a beginning and 
end. Due to the properties of imaginary numbers, the minus sign disappears if one takes 
an imaginary coordinate t .  This allows for solutions without edges, whether in space or 
“time,” which now is that imaginary time variable. 
Hawking seems to hold that we perceive the universe in real time, and thus with a 
beginning and end, but that the universe exists in imaginary time and hence with- 
out Singularities, without a beginning and end. “But . . . a scientific theory is just a 
mathematical model we make to describe our observations: it exists only in our minds. 
So it is meaningless to ask: Which is real, ‘real’, or ‘imaginary’ time? I t  is simply a matter 
ofwhich is the more useful description” (Hawking 1988, 139). The appeal to usefulness 
seems more instrumentalistic than in Hawking’s other writings-for instance, about the 
beginning (or its nonexistence) and God. 
5. It can be found in the eleventh book of Augustine’s Confessions. A similar idea 
had also been expressed a few centuries earlier by Philo of Alexandria, who even thought 
that time might start after the creation of the material world, when movement 
would begin. See sec. 26 of On the Account of the Worldi Creation by Moses by Philo of 
Alexandria. 
6. Penrose’s cosmological ideas have their background in the twistor program 
(Penrose 1972; Penrose and Rindler 1984 and 1986). We will not go into that part of his 
work; it is an original but not easily accessible approach. In short, Penrose holds that 
twistors represent a level of reality deeper than that of particles and space-time points. 
7. If there is a subsystem, the whole wave function is as the product of wave functions 
for the subsystem and for “everything else.” A measurement of the subsystem changes 
the first term in this product, but “everything else” remains the same (Tipler 1986, 247). 
This is in line with Hugh Everett’s original proposal (Everett 1957). The understanding 
of the Many Worlds Interpretation as if everything else also splits is more or less due to 
Bryce DeWitt (DeWitt and Graham 1973). 
8.  Lakatos’s methodology of scientific research programs (1970) has been applied 
both to theology and to religion and science-for example, by Nancey Murphy (1987; 
1990) and Hefner (1989). 
9. The existence of two levels of description, one timelessly viewing the whole of time 
at once and the other from within time, is quite common in physics. For example, systems 
can be described as evolutionary, but also by trajectories in phase space. These tra- 
jectories represent complete possible histories of the system. In Big Bang cosmology the 
four-dimensional space-time can be described as a three-dimensional spatial universe 
expanding in time. The peculiar feature of Hawking’s cosmology is that the timeless 
description is not about the whole history of time, but about individual slices of “now.” 
In that sense, this timeless description undermines the continuity between subsequent 
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slices more than do other timeless theories in physics. This might change because of 
future developments or reinterpretations of the theory. 
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